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OHIO'S DNA DATABANK STATUTE
Paul C. Giannelli
Albert J. Weatherhead Ill & Richard W Weatherhead
Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University
Jean Ann Broderick was sexually assaulted and murdered on November 17, 1991 in Minneapolis. There were
no suspects, and the possibility of another unsolved crime
loomed large. The police, however, discovered semen at
the crime scene, extracted a DNA profile from this evidence,
and entered the profile into the state DNA databank. The
computer responded with what is known as a "cold hit" - a
match that in an electronic second transformed a "no suspect" case to one with overwhelming prosecutorial merit. It
was the "first case in American history in which the new tool
of DNA databanking was used to solve a rape or murder
case." Levy, And the Blood Cried Out: A Prosecutor's
Spellbinding Account of the Power of DNA 128 (1996). The
prosecutor would later remark, "Without a DNA pool, there
is no way we would have been able to identify the suspect.
And we certainly would not have been able to get the conviction." ld. (quoting Steve Redding).
Ohio has created a DNA databank. RC 109.573 establishes the database, and RC 2901.07 specifies which prisoners are subject to profiling - mostly sex and violent
crime offenders. See 1 Katz & Giannelli, Baldwin's Ohio
Practice Criminal Law 20.14 (1999 supp.). RC 2151.315
governs juveniles.
STATE STATUTES
The first DNA databank used for criminal enforcement
purposes was established by the Virginia legislature in
1989. Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-310.2. Today, every state has
enacted databanking legislation. See Hilbert, DNA
Databanks: Law Enforcement's Greatest Surveillance
Tool?, 34 Wake Forest L. Rev. 767, 775 (1999). The DNA
Identification Act of 1994 provides federal funds to assist in
this endeavor. Although each state legislates the conditions
under which DNA samples are taken, the FBI has established a national databank system, called CODIS
(Combined DNA Index System), into which the state profiles
can be entered. Now states can search the databases of
other states.
The state databank statutes vary widely with respect to
their coverage. Some states require only sex offenders to
provide samples for databank use. E.g., Colo. Rev. Stat.§
17-2 201 (5)(g)(sexual assault). Other states also include

crimes of violence. E.g., Wash. Rev. Code§ 43.43.754; Mo.
§ 650.055. Still others reach all convicted felons. E.g., Ala.
Code § 36-18-24; N.M. Stat. Ann. § 29-16-6; Va. Code Ann.
§ 19.2-31 0.2; Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-19-403. One statute extends to persons arrested for a felony sex offense or other
specified crimes. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15-609. Some states
include juvenile offenders and others cover probationers as
well as parolees. Several databanks also contain DNA profiles of missing persons and victims of mass disasters. The
method of collection differs; some statutes require the collection of blood (sometimes a finger prick) while others collect cheek swabs. Some statutes contain expungement
procedures, under which a person's profile may be removed
from the database if that person's conviction is reversed on
appeal.
States also vary in the resources dedicated to DNA collection and analysis. Some states have made considerable
headway entering samples into their databases, while others face a tremendous backlog of samples yet to be analyzed. One report notes: "So while a new national FBI
databank and state databanks now hold a total of 270,000
DNA profiles, there is also a backlog of roughly 500,000 unanalyzed DNA specimens. And the DNA of an estimated 1
million more people is supposed to be added by law, but
some jurisdictions are already so far behind they're not
even bothering to collect new samples." The Uncharted
Future of DNA Detective Work, U.S. News & World Report,
Oct. 25, 1999, at 33.
While variations in the coverage and procedures for state
databases produce inconsistencies, state databanks do
share important similarities as well. First, DNA profiles are
generally kept in a database that identifies them by a coded
identification number. To determine the identity of the person, a separate database must be accessed that decodes
the• identification number and links the profile to a specific
individual. These security measures help to ensure that the
DNA profile does not provide readily useable information
about the identity of a particular individual. Second, DNA
databases generally contain one set of DNA profiles that
have been taken from identified individuals, and a second
set of profiles, usually taken from crime scenes, for which a
match is sought. If a crime scene profile does not result in a
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tion; independent state grounds have been raised but no
challenge has prevailed on this basis. See People v.
Calahan, 649 N.E.2d 588, 592 (Ill. App. 1995)("[D]efendant
has not met his burden of proving the statute unconstitutional under either the Federal or State constitution."); People v.
Wealer, 636 N.E.2d 1129, 1137 (Ill. App. 1994)(111. Const.
Art. I, § 6).

match, it remains in the system. Some time in the future it
may be matched with the profile of a subsequently convicted offender. Or, it may be matched with another crime
scene profile, alerting the police that they are looking for a
serial offender.
PRIVACY AND RELATED CONCERNS
The privacy issues associated with DNA profiling were
recognized from the beginning. In 1990 Congress's Office
of Technology Assessment highlighted this issue: "Citing
the inherent intimacy of genetic information, the current and
developing ability to test for personal information other than
unique identity, and the difficulties of maintaining the confidentially in a computer network, experts raise concerns that
genetic information could be used unfairly to deny future
benefits to persons with criminal records, and that genetic
profiling within the criminal justice sphere could lead to
wider testing and broader threats to privacy." Office of
Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress. Genetic Witness:
Forensic Uses of DNA Tests 35 (1990).
The National Academy of Science's 1992 DNA report
also took note of privacy concerns, citing developments in
both molecular biology and computer technology.
"Molecular geneticists are rapidly developing the ability to
diagnose a wide variety of inherited traits and medical conditions. The list already includes simply inherited traits,
such as cystic fibrosis, Huntington's disease, and some inherited cancers. In the future, the list might grow to include
more common medical conditions, such as heart disease,
diabetes, hypertension, and Alzheimer's disease. Some observers even suggest that the list could include such traits
as predispositions to alcoholism, learning disabilities, and
other behavioral traits (although the degree of genetic influence on these traits remains uncertain)." National
Research Council, DNA Technology in Forensic Science
114 (1992). The report goes on to state: "Even simple information about identity requires confidentiality. Just as fingerprint files can be misused, DNA profile identification information could be misused to search and correlate criminal-record databanks or medical record databanks.
Computer storage of information increases the possibilities
for misuse. For example, addresses, telephone numbers,
social security numbers, credit ratings, range of incomes,
demographic categories, and information on hobbies are
currently available for many of the citizens in our society
from various distributed computerized data sources."

SELF-INCRIMINATION CLAUSE
Challenges to the collection of blood or saliva grounded
in the Fifth Amendment have been quickly dismissed based
on well-established precedent. The leading case is
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966). While being
treated at a hospital for injuries sustained in an automobile
collision, Schmerber was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol. At the direction of the investigating police
officer, a physician obtained a blood sample from
Schmerber. Although the defendant objected to this procedure on the advice of counsel, his blood was extracted and
analyzed for alcoholic content. Before the Supreme Court,
Schmerber argued that the extraction of blood violated the
privilege against self-incrimination. Rejecting this argument,
the Court held that the privilege covers only communicative
or testimonial evidence, not physical or real evidence.
According to the Court:
It is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches
an accused's communications, whatever form they
might take.... On the other hand, both federal and
state courts have usually held that it offers no protection against compulsion to submit to fingerprinting,
photographing, or measurements, to write or speak for
identification, to appear in court, to stand, to assume a
stance, to walk, or to make a particular gesture. The
distinction which has emerged, often expressed in different ways, is that the privilege is a bar against compelling "communications" or "testimony," but that compulsion which makes a suspect or accused the source
of "real or physical evidence" does not violate it. ld. at
763.
Subsequent Supreme Court cases reaffirmed the testimonial-physical evidence distinction recognized in
Schmerber. In United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 222
(1967), the Court held that compelling an accused to exhibit
his person for observation was compulsion "to exhibit his
physical characteristics, not compulsion to disclose any
knowledge he might have" and thus not proscribed by the
privilege. In Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 266-67
(1967), the Court concluded that the compelled production
of a "mere handwriting exemplar, in contrast to the content
of what is written, like the voice or body itself, is an identifying physical characteristic outside [the Fifth Amendment's]
protection."
Courts addressing the Fifth Amendment argument in the
databank context have applied these precedents when rejecting such an argument. E.g., Shaffer v. Saffle, 148 F.3d
1180, 1181 (10th Cir.)(Oklahoma statute)("We rejected the
Fifth Amendment self-incrimination claim because the DNA
samples are not testimonial in nature."), cert. denied, 119
S.Ct. 520 (1998); Boling v. Romer, 101 F.3d 1336, 1340
(1Oth Cir. 1996)(Colorado statute) ("Plaintiff's Fifth
Amendment claim, alleging that requiring DNA samples
from inmates amounts to compulsory self-incrimination, fails
because DNA samples are not testimonial in nature.");
Cooper v. Gammon, 943 S.W.2d 699, 705 (Mo. App.
1997)(same).

LEGAL CHALLENGES
Databanks have been challenged on a wide range of
constitutional grounds -for example, freedom of religion
and the right to privacy. See Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302
(4th Cir. 1992)(privacy); State v. Olivas, 856 P.2d 1076
(Wash. 1993)(sam.e); Ryncarz v. Eikenberry, 824 F. Supp.
1493, 1502 (E.D. Wash. 1993)(Statute "is generally applied
to those within its purview and there is an absence of any
evidence that would question its neutrality regarding the
free exercise of religion. Both the statute and the accompanying DNA policy are neutral towards imposing a burden on
religion.").
Six constitutional grounds are discussed in this article:
self-incrimination, ex post facto, equal protection, due
process, cruel and unusual punishment, and unreasonable
search and seizure. In addition, states may provide greater
protection under state constitutions or statutes than the U.S.
Supreme Court has recognized under the federal constitu2

they had not violated any prison regulation. Several courts
have distinguished databank statutes on this basis, finding
that at the time of sentencing good-time credits were known
to be contingent on compliance with legitimate prison regulations and the nature of those regulations may be amended while the prisoner is serving penitentiary time. See
Gilbert v. Peters, 55 F.3d 237, 239 (7th Cir. 1995)
("Disciplinary measures imposed on inmates for failing to
obey orders ... do not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.");
Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 309-10 (4th Cir. 1992) ("The
Ex Post Facto Clause does not prevent prison administrators from adopting and enforcing reasonable regulations
that are consistent with good prison administration, safety
and efficiency. .. . It is precisely because reasonable prison
regulations, and subsequent punishment for infractions
thereof, are contemplated as part of the sentence of every
prisoner, that they do not constitute an additional punishment and are not classified as ex post facto. Moreover,
since a prisoner's original sentence does not embrace a
right to one set of regulations over another, reasonable
amendments, too, fall within the anticipated sentence of
every inmate.").

EX POST FACTO CLAUSE
The United States Constitution prohibits the retroactive
application of criminal laws. Article I provides that neither
Congress nor any State shall pass an "ex post facto Law."
U.S. Canst. Art. I,§ 9, cl. 3; U.S. Canst. Art. I,§ 10.
According to the Supreme Court, this prohibition means that
"[l]egislatures may not retroactively alter the definition of
crimes or increase the punishment of criminal acts." Collins
v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 42 (1990).
Non-Penal Purpose
Some courts have ruled that the ex post facto prohibition
does not apply because databanking statutes are not penal
in nature. For example, the Ninth Cir~uit rejected such a
challenge to the Oregon statute because its "obvious purpose is to create a DNA data bank to assist in the identification, arrest, and prosecution of criminals, not to punish convicted murderers and sexual offenders." Rise v. Oregon, 59
F.3d 1556, 1562 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1190
(1996). Accord Shaffer v. Saffle, 148 F. 3d 1180, 1182 (1Oth
Cir. 1998) ("other circuits have upheld similar statutes
against the same challenge"; because the "statutes have a
legitimate, non penal legislative purpose, they do not run
afoul of the Ex Post Facto Clause under these circumstances."), cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. 520 (1 998).
The ex post facto issue, however, does not necessarily
disappear merely by labeling a statute as "non-penal." Ex
post facto principles apply when punishment is retroactively
increased, and that may occur if a sanction for refusal to
provide a DNA sample is the denial of parole or the forfeiture of good time credits (credits awarded for a period of
good behavior in prison). See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. Dall.
386, 390 (1798) ("Every law that changes the punishment,
and inflicts greater punishment, than the law annexed to the
crime, when committed."). Much depends on how a parole
or good time statute is written.

EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
The Fourteenth Amendment establishes that no state
may "deny any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Several inmates have asserted equal
protection grounds as a basis for striking down databank
statutes. They claim, for example, that sex offenders are
treated differently from other offenders in violation of the
equal protection mandate.
These challenges have been rejected under what is
known as the "rational basis" test, which is derived from a
long line of Supreme Court decisions. Under this type of judicial review, a "statute is presumed to be valid and will be
sustained if the classification is rationally related to a legitimate state interest." Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Crenshaw,
486 U.S. 71, 81 (1988).
In Boling v. Romer, 101 F.3d 1336, 1341 (10th Cir. 1996)
(Colorado statute), the Tenth Circuit rejected the argument
that taking DNA samples only from sex offenders violated
the Equal Protection Clause. The court held that there was
a "rational relationship" between the "government's decision
to classify inmates as convicted sex offenders and the government's stated objective to investigate and prosecute unsolved and future sex crimes." See also Roe v. Marcottte
193 F. 3d 72, 82 (2d Cir. 1999) ("The district court correctly
found that the statute survives a rational basis analysis.
Plaintiffs presented no evidence that there was a compelling
need to test other violent felons.").

Parole
If parole is purely discretionary, a parole board may consider a refusal to comply with a valid prison regulation,
such as one requiring a DNA sample, in determining the appropriateness of parole. In contrast, an increase in the
length of a sentence caused by new conditions in a mandatory parole jurisdiction is suspect. For example, the Virginia
parole statute mandated parole six months before the sentence release date, and the Fourth Circuit ruled that withholding release for failure to provide DNA samples would be
unconstitutional. Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 31 0 (4th
Cir. 1992)("[T]he continued incarceration beyond a time six
months prior to the end of the actual sentence of an inmate
convicted prior to the enactment of [the statute] for any reason not reflected in the terms of the mandatory parole provision, would constitute a retroactive extension of the inmate's sentence which is prohibited by the Ex Post Facto
Clause.").

DUE PROCESS
Both the Fifth and the Fourteenth Amendments forbid the
denial of life, liberty, or property "without due process of
law." Inmates have asserted two different due process arguments: substantive due process and procedural due
process.

Good-Time Credit
Reduction of good-time credit raises somewhat different
issues. In Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 32 (1981), the
Supreme Court ruled that the elimination of good time-credit
constituted an increase in punishment because "a prisoner's eligibility for reduced imprisonment is a significant factor
entering into both the defendant's decision to plea bargain
and the judge's calculation of the sentence to be imposed."
Weaver, however, involved inmates whose good-time
credit was legislatively reduced across the board, even if

Substantive Due Process
The Supreme Court has stated that "[d]ue process of law
is a summarized constitutional guarantee of respect for
those personal immunities which ... are 'so rooted in the
traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as
fundamental' .. ·. or are 'implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty."' Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165,169 (1951).
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In Rocfiin the Supreme Court held that the forcible stomach pumping of a suspect to recover narcotic pills
"shock[ed] the conscience" and did not comport with traditional ideas of fair play and decency, thereby violating due
process. By contrast, the Supreme Court, faced with a due
process challenge in Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432
(1957), upheld the involuntary extraction of blood from a
suspect while he was unconscious after an automobile accident in order to determine whether he was intoxicated. In
distinguishing Rochin, the Court emphasized that unlike the
extraction of stomach contents, the extraction of blood was
performed "under the protective eye of a physician" and was
a routine and scientifically accurate method that did not involve the "brutality" and "offensiveness" present in Rochin.
ld. at 435-37 ("a blood test taken by a skilled technician is
not such 'conduct that shocks the conscience' ... nor such
a method of obtaining evidence that it offends a 'sense of
justice."').

(1992}, or if the force is excessive. Whitley v. Albers, 475
U.S. 312, 319 (1986)("[T]he infliction of pain in the course of
a prison security measure ... does not amount to cruel and
unusual punishment simply because it may appear in retrospect that the degree of force ... was unreasonable, and
hence unnecessary in the strict sense.").
Neither theory applied in this context. Here, force was
used to compel compliance with a valid prison regulation.
Courts have also held that placement in solitary confinement for failing to comply with an order to provide a blood
sample does not violate the Clause. See Cooper v. Gammon, 943 S.W.2d 699, 707 (Mo. App. 1997)("A refusal to
obey a lawful order undermines the authority of prison officials and affects the security and good order of the facility.").
See also Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472,485 (1995)
("Discipline by prison officials in response to a wide range of
misconduct falls within the expected parameters of the sentence imposed by a court of law.").

Procedural Due Process
Procedural due process mandates that a person cannot
be deprived of "life, liberty, or property" without a hearing
and certain procedural safeguards, although the nature of
the safeguards differs depending on the interest involved.
Some inmates have challenged DNA databank statutes on
the grounds that the taking of a DNA sample without a hearing deprives them of a liberty or property interest in their genetic material without due process of law. These challenges
have uniformly failed.
In Rise v. Oregon, 59 F.3d 1556, 1562-63 (9th Cir. 1994),
the plaintiffs argued that the Due Process Clause required
prison officials to provide an opportunity for a hearing before
requiring felons to submit a blood sample in accordance
with bre~iori's databank statute. The court held that "[t]he
extraction of blood from an individual in a simple, medically
acceptable manner, despite the individual's lack of an opportunity to object to the procedure, does not implicate the
Due Process Clause." Accord Cooper v. Gammon, 943
S.W.2d 699, 706 (Mo. App. 1997).
Similarly, in Boling v. Romer, 101 F. 3d 1336, 1340 (1Oth
Cir. 1997), the plaintiff challenged a Colorado statute that
required inmates convicted of sexual assault offenses to
submit a DNA sample as a condition of release on parole.
Without providing the sample, an inmate could not regain
his liberty. The court nevertheless found that plaintiff's argument that the state "unconstitutionally deprived him of a
property interest in his blood without due process" was "unpersuasive." The court explained that parole in Colorado
was discretionary and that convicted individuals have no
constitutional right to be conditionally released before the
expiration of their valid sentences.

1 ~~

SEARCH AND SEIZURE
The most significant legal challenge to databanks is
based on the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures. Although the U.S. Supreme
Court has yet to address the issue, its decisions in other
areas provide a framework for analysis.
The Fourth Amendment is intended to ensure "privacy,
dignity, and security of persons against certain arbitrary and
invasive acts by officers of the Government or those acting
at their direction." Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives'
Association, 489 U.S. 602, 613-14 (1989). There are three
distinct Fourth Amendment issues raised in this context.
First, there is a "seizure" of the person, which brings that
(
person under the control of government officials. Second,
there is the subsequent search and seizure of a biological
sample or trace evidence from this person. Third, the use
to which the genetic information in the sample is put raises
a final Fourth Amendment issue.
A finding that the Fourth Amendment applies does not
mean that a procedure is unconstitutional. That is merely
the first step in the analysis. As the Supreme Court has
often remarked: "[T]he Fourth Amendment does not proscribe all searches and seizures, but only those that are unreasonable." Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619
Applicability of the 4th Amendment
Seizure of the Person. In the databanking context the
first issue - seizure of the person - is not problematic because convicts are already incarcerated. The seizure would
be an issue for parolees, probationers, or previously released convicts. Nevertheless, notifying such persons to report and provide DNA samples would be a reasonable
seizure.
Search to Obtain Samples. The leading case on defining
which governmental activities are "searches" within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment is Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). Katz substituted a privacy approach for the traditional property approach to this issue.
According to the Supreme Court: "[T]he Fourth Amendment
protects people, not places. What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a
subject of Fourth Amendment protection. . . . But what he
seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to
the public, may be constitutionally protected."
There is little dispute that taking blood samples is a
search. In Schmerberthe Supreme Court held that the ex-

CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT
Several challenges to DNA databanks have been by prisoners who focused on the Eighth Amendment, which proscribes cruel and unusual punishment. In Sanqers v.
Coman, 864 F.Supp. 496, 498 (E.D. N.C. 1994)(North
Carolina), inmates argued that the use of force to obtain
blood samples violated the Amendment; they alleged: "The
uses of force have included instances of several officers
surrounding an inmate while one held his arm still, the
spraying of mace, and bending inmates' wrists in a painful
manner to induce compliance." An Eighth Amendment violation, however, occurs only if force is applied for the purpose of causing harm, Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1
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traction of blood for the purpose of scientific analysis "plainly constitutes searches of the 'persons"' within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment. In Skinner, which involved a
drug testing program, the Court wrote that "it is obvious that
this physical intrusion, penetrating beneath the skin, infringes ail expectation of privacy that society is prepared to
recognize as reasonable." In addition to blood samples,
lower courts have generally treated the taking hair, Bouse v.
Bussey, 573 F.2d 548, 550 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v.
D'Amico, 408 F.2d 331, 333 (2d Cir. 1969), and saliva samples as searches. United States v. Nicolosi, 885 F. Supp.
50, 55 (E.D. N.Y. 1995).
In contrast, the taking of fingerprints, voice exemplars, or
handwriting samples are not searches. Cupp v. Murphy, 412
U.S. 291, 294 (1 973); United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S.
1,14 (1 973); United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19, 21 (1 973).
Use of Genetic Information. In Skinner the Supreme
Court also ruled that the subsequent chemical analysis of a
blood sample to obtain physiological data "is a further invasion" of privacy interests - informational privacy. This point
was further refined when the Court considered the collection
of urine samples. Even though this procedure did not involve a bodily intrusion, the Court held that it was a search.
Like blood, the chemical analysis of urine can "reveal a host
of private medical facts," including whether a person is
epileptic, pregnant, or diabetic. See also People v. Wealer,
636 N.E.2d 1129, 1132 (Ill. App. 1994) ("conducting additional analysis on the sample further implicates fourth
amendment interests.")
The courts addressing the constitutionality of databank
statutes have acknowledged the applicability of the Fourth
Amendment to the taking of a sample as well as its subsequent analysis. E.g., Schlicher v. (NFN) Peters, I & II, 103
F. 3d 940, 942 (1Oth Cir. 1996)("1t is agreed that the collection, analysis and storage of blood and saliva as authorized
by [the Kansas statute] is a search and seizure within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.")(citing Skinner and
Schmerber'); Landry v. Attorney General, 709 N.E.2d 1085,
1090 (Mass. 1999)(''There is no disagreement that th~ involuntary collection of a blood sample from a person designated to furnish one under the Act constitutes a 'search and
seizure' for purposes of the Fourth Amendment and art. 14
[of the state constitution]."); People v. Wealer, 636 N.E.2d
1129, 1132 (Ill. App. 1994)("Nor do the parties dispute that
the taking of saliva samples implicates fourth Amendment
concerns, although it seems that the level of intrusion necessary to obtain a salvia sample would on its face appear
lower than the required for extracting blood."); State v.
Olivas, 856 P.2d 1076, 1081 (Wash. 1993)(''The State acknowledges that nonconsensual blood extraction constitutes a search.").
Consequently, the databanking litigation has focused on
the second step in Fourth Amendment analysis -the reasonableness of these programs.

have been recognized, and courts have cited several in upholding DNA databank statutes.
The databank cases can be grouped around three lines
of precedents: (1) administrative searches, (2) "special
needs" searches, and (3) prisoner searches. These categories, however, are not mutually exclusive- and they all
involve a balancing of interests in determining the reasonableness of the procedure. The next sections focus on sexoffenders, the most common category in the DNA data. banks. Later sections discuss persons convicted of other
crimes and arrestees.

Administrative Search Model
Originally, the phrase administrative search was used to
describe non-law enforcement searches. For example, the
landmark case, Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523,
538 (1967), involved housing inspections. The purpose of
these inspections was not to gather evidence of criminal
conduct but rather to ensure compliance with health and
safety standards. Housing inspectors rather than police officers conducted these searches. Violation of the regulations, however, could result in criminal prosecution.
In Camara, the Court held that the reasonableness of an
administrative search is determined by balancing the governmental interest against the nature and extent of the intrusion on privacy.
The ... argument is in effect an assertion that the area
inspection is an unreasonable search. Unfortunately,
there can be no ready test for determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search
against the invasion which the search entails. But we
think that a number of persuasive factors combine to
support the reasonableness of area code-enforcement
inspections. First, such programs have a long history
of judicial and public acceptance. Second, the public
interest demands that all dangerous conditions be prevented or abated, yet it is doubtful that any other canvassing technique would achieve acceptable results.
Many such conditions- faulty wiring is an obvious example - are not observable from outside the building
arid indeed may not be apparent to the inexpert occupant himself. Finally, because inspections are neither
personal in nature nor aimed at the discovery of evidence of crime, they involve a relatively limited invasion of the urban citizen's privacy. ld. at 536-37 (citations omitted).
The Court found the inspection system '"of indispensable
importance to the maintenance of community health."'
Thus, in Camara, the Court concluded that housing inspection programs were supported by the compelling government interest of avoiding dangerous living conditions and
maintaining housing stock and that the inspection programs
were a reasonable means for enforcing these societal interests.
Later cases involved the inspection of liquor stores, gun
dealers, mines, and the workplace pursuant to the
Occupational Safety and Health Act. See United States v.
Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972); Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S.
594 (1981); Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
Perhaps, the most familiar administrative search is the
metal detector procedures at airports.
New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987), is a transitional
case in this context. It involved a New York statute authorizing warrantless administrative searches of automobile junkyards, which the Supreme Court upheld. The key point is

Reasonableness of Search
As noted above, the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit
all searches, only unreasonable ones. Traditionally, reaso_nable searches are those conducted pursuant to a warrant ISsued by a neutral and detached magistrate and based on
probable cause. Moreover, search warrants must describe
the place to be searched and the items to be seized with
"particularity." The particularity requirement circumscribes
the police's discretion in executing a search warrant.
Nevertheless, exceptions to these traditional requirements
5

that:the,staJIJtewas aimed specifically at finding evidence of
c;irne. In contrast, prior administrative searches had focused on governmental interests such as health and safety.
Moreover, the junkyard inspections were conducted by the
police. In a later case, the Court employed the balancing
test to uphold sobriety roadblock-checkpoints. Michigan
Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990).
While the balancing approach provides flexibility in
achieving significant government objectives, such as airline
passenger safety, the danger exists that this approach will
result in the "balancing" away of constitutional rights.
Therefore, this approach demands rigor. For example,
while the Supreme Court has upheld drug testing of railroad
employees after an accident and custom's officers involved
in drug interdiction operations, it has struck down the drug
testing of political candidates as mandated by a Georgia
statute. Miller v. Chandler, 502 U.S. 305 (1997). The Court
simply found that the justification for this procedure lack
compelling reasons.
Roe v. Marcotte, 193 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 1999), can be used
to illustrate this approach. In this case, the Second Circuit
reviewed the Connecticut databank statute, which is limited
to sex offenders. First, the court correctly found the government interest - solving past and future violent sex crimes
- both legitimate and significant. See People v. Wealer,
636 N.E.2d 1129, 1136 (Ill. App. 1994) ("Its interest is especially compelling when we consider that sex offenders frequently target children as their victims."). Moreover, the
databank system "may" deter future crimes by those whose
profile are in the system.
Second, the means selected to accomplish these objectives were reasonable. The state cited studies showing a
highrC!te of recidivism for sexual offenders. Moreover, DNA
evidence is "particularly useful" in investigating these crimes
"because of the nature of the evidence left at the scenes of
these crimes and the demonstrated reliability of DNA testing."
Third, the blanket testing of all sex offenders eliminated
the need for discretionary decisions, an historical concern in
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. See Shelton v.
Gudmanson, 934 F. Supp. 1048, 1051 (W.O. Wis. 1996)
("the sampling was carried out pursuant to state regulations
that required the testing of every inmate falling with a certain category, thus ensuring that arbitrary testing decisions
would not be made.").
Fourth, the intrusion -the extraction of blood - is slight
("minimal" in the Supreme Court's view) and does not raise
a health risk. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 625 (blood tests do
not "infringe significant privacy interests"); Winston v. Lee,
470 U.S. 753, 762 (1985) ("recognized society's judgment
that blood tests do not constitute an unduly extensive impositiorfon a individual's personal privacy and bodily integrity."). In these circumstances, the Second Circuit held that
the balance tipped in favor of the databanking statute.
Three other aspects of the Connecticut scheme are noteworthy. First, trained medical personnel are required to take
the blood sample. See also People v. Wealer, 636 N.E.2d
1129, 1136 (Ill. App. 1994)("[T]he collection of samples must
be performed in a medically approved manner, and only
certain qualified medical personnel are permitted to withdraw blood."). Second, the identifying information associated with the DNA profile remains anonymous until a match is
made. Third, procedures limiting access to and dissemination of information in the system are specified. See also

People v; Wealer, 636 N.E.2d 1129, 1136 (Ill. App.
1994)("[T]he information is kept strictly confidential and is
made available only to law enforcement officials.").
"Special Needs" Search Model
Over time, the Supreme Court extended the rationale underlying administrative searches to other areas, commonly
called "special needs" searches. For example, the Court in
New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985), applied this rationale to searches of public school children by teachers;
the "special need" was the maintenance of a safe, orderly,
and contraband-free school environment in order to create a
healthy learning atmosphere. To achieve the desired environment, the Court recognized that "the school setting requires some easing of the restrictions to which searches by
public authorities are ordinarily subject." ld. at 340. See
also O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987)(employing
"special needs" concept to the search of a government employee's work spEJ.ce for evidence of work-related violations).
Similarly, in Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987), the
Supreme Court upheld a Wisconsin regulation that permitted a warrantless search of a probationer's home if there
existed "reasonable grounds" to believe that the probationer
possessed contraband. The Court observed that "[a]
State's operation of a probation system, like its operation of
a school, government office or prison, or its supervision of a
regulated industry, likewise presents 'special needs' beyond
normal law enforcement that may justify departures from the
usual warrant and probable-cause requirements" and that
"in certain circumstances government investigators conducting searches pursuant to a regulatory scheme need not adhere to the usual warrant or probable-cause requirements
as long as their searches meet 'reasonable legislative or administrative standards."' ld. at 873-74 (quoting Camara at
538).
Subsequently, the Court applied this rationale in cases
involving government-required alcohol and drug testing for
railroad employees and customs agents involved in drug interdiction. See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Assn,
489 U.S. 602, 620-21 (1989)(railway safety)(Federal
Railway Administration "has prescribed toxicological tests,
not to assist in the prosecution of employees, but rather 'to
prevent accidents and casualties in railroad operations that
result from impairment of employees by alcohol or drugs");
National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S.
656, 665-66 (1989)("[W]here a Fourth Amendment intrusion
serves special governmental needs, beyond the normal
need for law enforcement, it is necessary to balance the individual's privacy expectations against the Government's interests to determine whether it is impractical to require a
warrant or some level of individualized suspicion in the particular context."). See also Vernonia School District v.
Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995) (approving suspicionless drug
testing of student athletes).
In the school and probationer cases, the special need resulted in a lesser standard (reasonable suspicion instead of
probable cause) of justification for an invasion of privacy,
while the drug testing cases upheld regulatory schemes that
did not require any quantum of proof.
A number of courts have used the "special needs" rationale to uphold databank statutes. See Shelton v.
Gudmanson, 934 F. Supp. 1048, 1051 (W.O. Wisconsin
1996)("Aithough the state's DNA testing of inmates is ultimately for a law enforcement goal, it seems to fit within the
6
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special needs analysis the Court has developed for drug
testing and searches of probationers' homes, since it is not
undertaken for the investigation of a specific crime."); State
v. Olivas, 856 P.2d 1076, 1086 (Wash. 1993) (rejecting a
Fourth Amendment challenge to a DNA identification based
on "special needs" analysis of Skinner).
In contrast, other courts have balked at applying the
"special needs" rationale in this context, noting that this category is limited to governmental objectives ''beyond normal
law enforcement." See People v. Wealer, 636 N.E.2d 1129,
1135 (Ill. App. 1994)("[W]e are reluctant to extend the special needs line of cases to the present statute, which has an
ostensible law enforcement purpose."); State v. Olivas, 856
P.2d 1076, 1092 (Wash. 1993)(concurring opinion)("The
choice of balancing tests, however, is critical. Because
'special needs' is not limited to minimally intrusive searches
or seizures, an extension of the analysis into the area of
criminal law enforcement could ultimately render the warrant requirement itself illusory.").
Other courts point out, however, that special needs
searches, such as probationer searches, are also associated with law enforcement but do not involve the investigation
of a specific crime. Shelton v. Gudmanson, 934 F. Supp.
1048, 1050-51 (W.O. Wis. 1996)(Wisconsin statute) ("In
Griffin, for example, the Court noted that the warrantless
search of the probationer's home had been carried out pursuant to valid regulation promulgated by the· state. Although
the state's DNA testing of inmates is ultimately for a law enforcement goal, it seems to fit within the special needs
analysis the Court had developed for drug testing and
search of probationers' homes, since it is not undertaken for
the investigation of a specific crime.")( citation omitted).
More importantly, as noted above, the administrative
search and "special needs" categories are not mutually exclusive - indeed, they often overlap. This is because the
"special need" beyond traditional law enforcement is typically some administrative objective. For example, an inventory
search of the personal belongings of arrestees prior to incarceration in a jail cell is reasonable, whether classified as
a "special need" or an administrative search. Similarly, this
procedure could also be considered a prison search, the
next category to be considered. The important point is the
"balancing" rationale employed in determining reasonableness. There may, however, be a tendency in some opinions
to use the "special needs" as a talismanic incantation, curtailing further inquiry.

seizure. This is so in light of an inmate's diminished privacy
rights; the minimal intrusion of saliva and blood tests; and
the legitimate government interest in the investigation and
prosecution of unsolved and future criminal acts by the use
of DNA in a manner not significantly different from the use
of fingerprints."); Rise v. Oregon, 59 F.3d 1556, 1562 (9th
Cir. 1995)('Taking into account all of the factors discussed
above- the reduced expectations of privacy held by persons convicted of one of the felonies to which [the statute)
applies, the blood extractions' relatively minimal intrusion
into these persons's privacy interests, the public's incontestable interest in preventing recidivism and identifying and
prosecuting murderers and sexual offenders, and the likelihood that a DNA data bank will advance this interest - we
conclude that [the statute) is reasonable and therefore constitutional under the Fourth .A.mendment."), cert. denied, 517
U.S. 1161 (1996); In re Maricopa County Juvenile Action,
930 P.2d 496 (Ariz. App. 1996) Uuvenile sex offenders);
Landry v. Attorney General, 709 N.E.2d 1085, 1092 (Mass.
1999); Cooper v. Gammon, 943 S.W.2d 699, 705 (Mo. App.
1997)("Because of the reduced expectation of privacy held
by prisoners .... ").
The first Supreme Court decision is Bell v. Wolfish, 441
U.S. 520, 558-60 (1979), in which the Court upheld the constitutionality of body cavity inspections of pretrial inmates
following "contact visits," even in the absence of probable
cause. The Court's rationale in determining the reasonableness of the procedure focused on the security dangers inherent in this environment: "A detention facility is a unique
place fraught with serious security dangers. Smuggling of
money, drugs, weapons, and other contraband is all too
common an occurrence. And inmate attempts to secrete
these items into the facility by concealing them in body
cavities are documented in this record."
In a later case, Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984),
the Supreme Court upheld cell searches ("shakedown" inspections) for the purpose of discovering contraband in a
prison. The Court, in a 5-4 decision, ruled that a prisoner
did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in a cell.
Yet, this holding (like Wolfish) was justified on institutional
security needs. The Court wrote: 'The recognition of privacy rights for prisoners in their individual cells simply cannot
be reconciled with the concept of incarceration and the
needs and objectives of penal institutions." ld. at 526.
There are no institutional security needs in the databanking context, and thus this rationale is simply inapplicable.
Indeed, some statutes apply even in the absence of incarceration. See People v. Wealer, 636 N.E.2d 1129, 1135 (Ill.
App. 1994)("[P]ractical considerations of prison administration, as an underlying justification, cannot be reconciled with
the express language of [the statute) which mandates taking
samples regardless of whether the convicted sex offender is
ultimately incarcerated."). Moreover, both Wolfish and
Hudson acknowledged that the Court's jurisprudence in
prisoner cases recognizes the applicability of constitutional
protections: "There is no iron curtain drawn between the
Constitution and the prisons of this country." Wolff v.
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1974). See also
Giannelli & Gilligan, Prison Searches and Seizures:
"Locking" the Fourth Amendment Out of Correctional
Facilities, 62 Va. L. Rev. 1045 (1976).

Fourth Amendment Rights of Prisoners
In Jones v. Murray, 62 F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1992), the
Fourth Circuit adopted a third type of analysis. In upholding
the Virginia statute, the Fourth Circuit relied on several
Supreme Court decisions that had held that prisoners had
reduced expectations of privacy under the Fourth
Amendment. See also Shaffer v. Saffle, 148 F.3d 1180,
1181 (1Oth Cir. 1998)(0klahoma statute)("[W]hile obtaining
DNA samples implicates Fourth Amendment concerns, it is
reasonable in light of an inmate's diminished privacy rights,
the minimal intrusion involved, and the legitimate government interest in using DNA to investigate and prosecute
crimes."); Schlicher v. (NPN) Peters, I & I, 103 F.3d 940
(1Oth Cir. 1996)(Kansas statute)(same); Boling v. Romer,
101 F.3d 1336, 1340 (1Oth Cir. 1996) ("[W]hile obtaining and
analyzing the DNA or saliva of an inmate convicted of a sex
offense is a search and seizure implicating Fourth
Amendment concerns, it is a reasonable search and

Expansion of Coverage Beyond Sex Offenders
Most databank statutes are limited to sex-offenders.
These provisions are supported by empirical research on
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recidivism, a fact noted by several courts in upholding dataSheltonv. Gudmanson, 934 F. Supp.
1048, 1051 (W.D. Wis. 1996)(The state "has confined the
collec;ting of such data to those offenders [sex offenses] that
have been shown to have a relatively high likelihood of recidivism."). The nature of these offenses- their brutality
and their often serial nature- is a critical point, because in
one sense all law enforcement is a legitimate governmental
objective. However, some statutes also encompass homicides and crimes of violence. Still others include all felons.
The justification for including prisoners who have been convicted of white-collar felonies is difficult to discern. Even the
sex offender category is problematic if it includes prostitution and public indecency as some statutes do.
Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1992), the Fourth
Circuit case cited above, addressed this issue because all
felons are included in the Virginia system. To buttress its
position, the court cited recidivism studies encompassing all
felons. The inmates, however, argued that the statistics on
nonviolent felons undercut the state's position. The inmates' "statistics indicate[d) that 97% of the cases in which
DNA evidence was used to link a defendant with a crime involved murder or rape, and further, less than 1% of all nonviolent offenders are later arrested on murder and rape
charges." ld. at 308. In response, the Jones majority merely
noted that the percentages need not be high where the objective is significant and the privacy intrusion is limited; the
court cited Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S.
444 (1990) (upholding roadblock to detect drunk drivers despite resulting arrest rate of 1.5%).
The dissent in Jones believed that the distinction between violent and nonviolent felons was determinative:
''The only state interest offered by the Commonwealth for including non-violent felons is administrative ease" but such
an interest does not suffice "to outweigh a prisoner's expectation of privacy in not having blood withdrawn from his
body when that prisoner is not significantly more likely to
commit a violent crime in the future than a member of the
general population." ld. at 313-14. Indeed, the state senate
report concluded that recidivism data only "supported the inclusion of plaintiffs convicted for felony sex offenses, assault, capital murder, first and second degree murder, voluntary manslaughter, larceny and burglary." ld. at 314. All
felons were added to make the databank "more efficient and
cost effective." The dissent also pointed to other statistics in
the record: "United States Justice Department statistics
provided in the record show that only %0.4 of"non-violent
felons are later arrested on rape charges, and only %0.8
are later arrested on murder charges. One might assume

non-violent drug offenders would be more likely to commit
violent crime subsequent to release than other non-violent
felons; yet, only %0.4 of them are later arrested for rape,
and %0.3 for murder." The dissenting judge concluded:
The lack of justification "leads me to a deep, disturbing, and
overriding concern that, without a proper and compelling
justification, the Commonwealth may be successful in taking
significant strides toward the establishment of a future police state, in which broad and vague concerns for administrative efffciency will serve to support substantial intrusions
into the privacy of citizens." ld.
The British experience, which commenced earlier than
that of the United States, may be instructive. The British initially focused on sex offenses but later included burglaries
and car theft because of the high number of matches. They
found a cross-over between offenses. According to one official, "People who commit serious crime very often have
convictions for petty crime in their history." Wade, FB.I. Set
to Open Its DNA Database for Fighting Crime, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 12, 1998 (quoting David Ward, manager of the DNA
database for England and Wales). While the cross-over
concept is significant, the scope of the British system is
breathtaking; they expect to "eventually include a third of all
English men between 16 and 30, the principal ages for
committing crimes."
The category of crimes subject to databanking should be
supported by empirical data or persuasive reasons. There
is apparently some support for including property crimes.
Property crimes, however, should be further defined. For
example, historically, burglary was not considered a "property" crime; it was a crime against habitation, intended to
protect people in their dwellings. Burglars must anticipate
what action they will take if surprised by an occupant, including the use of force. Therefore, an argument to include
burglary could be made, but felony tax evasion would be a
different issue.

baf:lls~statutes:-See

Expansion of Coverage to Arrestees
The Louisiana statute applies to sex offender arrestees.
Moreover, New York Police Commissioner Howard Safir has
proposed that DNA be collected from every arrestee.
Hansen, Banking on DNA, 85 A.B.A. J. 26, 27 (Aug. 1999).
Not satisfied with that proposal, New York Mayor Rudy
Giuliani suggested that all newborns should be tested.
Higgins, Acid Test, 85 A.B.A. J. 64, 65 (Oct. 1999). In contrast, a concurring opinion in State v. Olivas, 856 P.2d 1076,
1094 (Wash. 1993), notes: "We would be appalled, I hope,
if the State mandated non-consensual blood tests of the
public at large for purposes of developing a comprehensive
Washington DNA databank."
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